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Abstract-In a recent paper, Reiter and Criscuolo[3] remark “that (semantic) networks are notational 
variants of logical formulae is by now a truism in Artificial Intelligence circles”. Shamelessly exploiting the 
foregoing quote as a pretext, I attempt to sketch adequate semantic accounts for at least two (kinds of1 
semantic network formalisms; one, based on the notion of inheritance, one, not. A crucial condition of 
adequacy lo be satisfied is fidelity to some of the intuitions of the creators of the formalisms. 
1. IMPRIMATUR 
Whatever else we decide to include under A.I., I would like to join those who claim for it the 
task of developing, maintaining, and using computer-interpretable formalisms for represesent- 
ing knowledge.. . . One might view some of the representational formalisms being studied in 
A.I. as attempts to create languages that possess the precision and computer-interpretable 
properties of a mathematical notation, but do so for a much wider range of concepts than those 
dealt with by classical mathematics [ 11. 
2. DOCTRINAL PREAMBLE 
One often hears that modal (or some other) logic is pointless because it can be translated 
into some simpler language in a first-order way. Take no notice of such arguments. There is no 
weight to the claim that the original system must therefore be replaced by the new one. What is 
essential is to single out important concepts and to investigate their properties. The fact that the 
real numbers can be defined in terms of sets is no argument for being interested in nrbitrary 
sets. One must look among the sets for the significant ones and cannot be censured if one finds 
the intrinsic properties of the reals more interesting than any of their formulations in set theory. 
Of course if we can argue that set theory provides other significant concepts, then we may find 
some reason for going beyond the real numbers (and it is not hard to find the reasons!). But 
clearly this discussion cannot proceed on purely formal grounds alone[2]. 
AMEN! 
3. INTRODUCTION 
In a recent paper, Reiter and Criscuolo remark that “the fact that networks are notational 
variants of logical formulae is by now a truism in Artificial Intelligence circles”[3]. Let US put 
aside the empirical, sociological claim-about which I am more than willing to defer to Messrs. 
Reiter and Criscuolo. Let us look rather at the content of the truism itself. 
When we do so, we notice a certain ambiguity. Perhaps, Reiter and Criscuolo are supposing 
that there is at least one logical language for whose formulae the “sentential analogues” of each 
and every semantic network formalism are notational variants. Or, switching the quantifiers, 
perhaps the claim is that for every semantic network formalism there is at least one logical 
language of which it is a notational variant. Now these are two very different claims. (One could 
easily imagine a third, stronger claim, being presupposed, viz. that all semantic network 
schemes are notational variants of, in particular, the language and logic of classical, first-order 
quantification theory. I will, in what follow s, address myself to this strongest, most specific, 
view as well.) 
I am not going to speculate on which of the three views Reiter and Criscuolo really had in 
mind. Indeed, the quote from Reiter and Criscuolo is the merest pretext for the present paper. I
intend to sketch quite different semantic accounts for two different (kinds of) semantic network 
formalisms, one organized around the notion of inheritance, the other, not; the latter, keyed to a 
certain family of intensional contexts, the former, not. Most important, the semantic accounts 
will differ and, with luck, the diferences will reflect diflerences in the central intuitions of the 
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semantic net theorists concehed. The aim is, simply, to try to take semantic net theorists at 
their word; and to show that, in doing so, one must range fairly far and wide beyond the 
confines of standard first-order logic. I am not going to argue for adopting any particular 
semantic net formalism; nor am I going to examine any of the intuitions motivating the work to 
be discussed. 
To make clear my intentions, let me note two ways in which one might fail to take the 
“semantic(s)” in “semantic network” seriously. The first is embodied in the work of Quillian, 
Collins et al., work which originated the semantic network tradition. By my lights, the 
structures described in this work are not intended to be languages; rather they are part of a 
theory or model of a certain range of memory-related psychological phenomena. The nodes in 
the network might be words, or even sets of sentences, but the accounts of the network are not 
semantic accounts; they do not constitute a semantic theory. There is no attempt o account for 
the meaningfulness, or describe the meaning, of the nodes. This, of course, is no criticism of the 
work; nor am I suggesting that the researchers in question were confused about the present 
point. So much for the first way of not taking the “semantics” of semantic network formalisms 
seriously. 
As a second way of not taking the semantics of semantic net formalisms eriously, I have in 
mind the following doctrine: the only way to interpret semantic network formalisms emantic- 
ally, no matter what the semantic network theorists may say, is to treat them as notational 
variants of standard first-order languages, with their standard “Tarski-style” semantics. This 
might best be described as a way of not taking semantic network theorists seriously. It is 
against his view, in particular, that I mean to deploy the quotation from Dana Scott with which 
I started. Of course, for all I know, no one holds this view; in which case, I am arguing only 
against phantoms of my own fevered imagination. So much the better. I, at any rate, want to try 
to take some semantic net theorists at their very word. Let the appropriate semantic account 
fall out however it may. 
4. SNePS 
I want first to discuss a system in which the notion of inheritance plays no (special) role. It 
would also be nice to have a case in which the theorists are both explicit about their motivating 
intuitions and diligent in presenting sufficient detail on which to hang semantic speculation. Sad 
to say, this narrows the field down quite a bit. Still, there are at least two choices; the 
(atypically nameless) system of Schubert, Cercone and Goebel[4] and Shapiro’s SNePS[S, 61. I
have decided to examine the latter; and this, for two reasons. First, Shapiro (and Shapiro and 
Maida[7,8]) presents a fairly explicit “philosophy of semantic networks”, as well as an 
enormous body of detailed description of the workings of the system. I think the philosophy is 
widely shared and trying to account for the considerations operative in its formulation raises 
interesting problems. Second, Schubert et al. are too explicit for my purposes. It is quite clear 
that they view their formalism as a Montague-style type-theoretic, intensional system. It would, 
I think, be illuminating to work out in detail a semantic account for the system described in [4]; 
but there can anyway be no doubt about the “logical space” within which we would find 
ourselves. This is not the case, or so I shall claim, for SNePS. A semantic account appropriate 
to it will force us to wander into largely, though not completely unexplored, territory. (And this, 
I also claim, is no argument against SNePS. Remember the wisdom of the great Scott.) 
Shapiro has argued that we should impose the following conditions on semantic networks: 
(1) Each node represents a unique concept. 
(2) Each concept represented in the network is represented by a node. 
(3) Each concept represented in the network is represented by a unique node (the Unique- 
ness Principle). 
(4) Arcs represent non-conceptual (logical?--D.I.) binary relations between odes [7,8]. 
In what follows I shall take Shapiro to be simply describing SNePS, thus ignoring his 
arguments for imposing these conditions on all semantic networks. I shall also (largely) ignore 
the fourth condition and, for that matter, a fifth: “the knowledge represented about each 
concept is represented by the structure of the entire network connected to the node represent- 
ing that concept.” 
On the basis of these conditions, Shapiro (and Shapiro and Maida) contend that “all nodes 
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of a semantic network represent only intentions”[7]. Again, I shall take this as describing 
SNePS, not as prescribing for all semantic networks. 
Now what are we to make of this? Raising the question this way raised the issue as to 
whether my intensions toward SNePS are honorable. I hope they are. Appearances to the 
contrary notwithstanding, I am not singling out a few lines, ripped out of context, for malicious 
attention. First, no malice is intended and I trust no harm is done. Second, and more important, 
my reconstruction of SNePS attempts to embrace a large number of the claims and arguments 
in the texts. I will not attempt o support my claim in this respect by citation. I hope that any 
one who has read the papers will agree that I have presented at least one way of construing 
them-not the only way, and perhaps not the way favored by the authors. As for those who 
have not read the material, I fear they shall have to take me at my (immediately preceding) 
word. 
Let’s remind ourselves of the project. We are to find a language-cum-semantics which can 
reasonably be taken to be that formal system, formulae of which correspond to the sentential 
pieces of SNePS. What, for instance, does the logical vocabulary of our target language consist 
of? Here we get help for [6,9]. For our purposes, what’s crucial is that the logical constants 
mentioned are generalizations of the familiar truth-functional connectives and quantifiers. But 
what of the quantifiers; over what do the bound variables range; what kinds of things are 
assigned to the variables? 
We might as well start at the beginning and specify how atomic predicational formulae are 
to be understood. The standard way of handling intensions in contemporary logic is to treat 
them as functions from an index set of contexts or possible worlds into some set-theoretic 
construct on the domain of the model structure. So, to take an important instance, properties- 
the intensions associated with monadic predicates-are explicated as functions from the index 
set into subsets of the domain of possible individuals. We might, then, try imagining a model 
structure consisting of a domain D of possible? entities, a non-empty set I (the index set or the 
set of possible worlds), and (optionally) a distinguished element w of I to represent he real 
world. Now define an individual concept in such a model structure as a function ic from I into 
D. (Total or partial? The traditional answer has always been total; but it is not clear what 
answer is appropriate to SNePS.)S 
What, then, can we say about individual terms, about individual variables, individual 
constants. and definite descriptions of individuals? Given what Shapiro says, it is hard to see 
how there is any alternative to a uniform intensional treatment. In specifying models for 
SNePS, all such terms (including, nota bene, individual variables) get interpreted by being 
associated with individual concepts (not individuals, not members of D). A model for SNePS 
will associate with each individual constant an individual concept (a member of the set of 
functions from I into D) and assignments relative to such a model will do the same for 
individual variables. This means that the modal language-cum-logic is not of the standard 
variety. I said that I would be assuming the general framework of Kripke-Montague 
style model-theoretic accounts; however, neither Kripke nor Montague propose semantic 
accounts in which the individual variables get assigned individual concepts. Dana Scott’s advice 
that one opt for just such a uniform treatment of all individual terms[2], which, as it happens 
Shapiro seems to be following, has been followed by just about no one else except Aldo 
Bressan in “A General Interpreted Modal Calculus”[l3]. 
Enough about individual terms; how shall we handle predicate letters? Remember: all nodes 
are intensional. Individual terms are associated with individual concepts, not with possible 
individuals; so we can not, in good conscience, assign (e.g.) to one-place predicate letters 
functions from I to subsets of D. That is, we can’t assign to one-place predicate letters sets of 
possible individuals. The obvious move might seem to be to associate sets of individual 
concepts with monadic predicate letters; but this does not render “predicate-nodes” truly 
intensional. The extension of a predicate at a world is no doubt a set of individual concepts; but 
+Or to be faithful to Shapiro: conceivable. 
iAs we shall see. there are reasons for thinking this effort to reconstrue SNePS-style intentions in terms of 
Kripke-Montague model-theoretic treatments of intensional contexts slightI) misguided. I shall suppress them till the end 
of rn) discussion of SNePS. As for such model-theoretic treatments themselves. the classic sources are [IO-121. 
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what is its intension? Surely~ it is (as both Bressan and Scott insist) a function from I into the 
power set of the set of individual concepts. Or what comes to the same thing, a function from 
individual concepts into propositions, where these are functions from I into {T, F}. (Shapiro is 
explicitly committed to “propositional nodes”-nodes for “concepts of the TRUE” and 
“concepts of the FALSE”[7,8].) So, predication is an intensional functor. 
By the way, this does make’it a little hard to understand what Shapiro says about MEMBER 
and CLASS arcs, and the relation between these and ISA arcs[6]. Arcs represent “structural 
relations”, which, given the examples, must mean binary logical functors. So ISA links 
represent he predication functor; but this functor must be intensional, i.e. at each world i, the 
truth value of “Fx” (x is an F) is not a function solely of the extension of “x” in i. In general, 
the relation between “Fx” and “x is a member of the set {y: Fy}” is complicated. In particular, 
it is relatively straightforward only for extensional predicates, predicates which informally meet 
the following condition: they apply to a given ic x (at i) iff they apply to any d such that 
d = x(i). The truth value at a world of a sentence predicating an extensional predicate to an ic 
does depend only on the extension of that ic at that wor1d.t 
Skipping lots of nasty details, we are now in a position to wave our hands, with some 
confidence, over the first order quantifiers. But note the “first-order” in the foregoing. Shapiro 
explicitly mentions the availability of higher-order constructs in SNePS. Thus, he says we can 
have nodes representing the second-order concepts of a property being extensional and of a 
property being intensional[71. It’s not clear how high we can go in this vein, and for reasons of 
space I herewith demur.+ 
Finally, there is the problem of propositional concepts. There are problems, in particular, 
about sentences embedded in intensional functors, such as “Necessarily . . . ” or “S believes 
that. . .” About the tirst, Shapiro doesn’t have much to say. Later., I shall suggest hat the 
reason why he doesn’t, throws light on the fact that many of the choices we’ve made in giving a 
semantic account of SNePS seem ill-motivated by the texts. 
The only intensional contexts Shapiro (and Shapiro and Maida) discusses are propositional 
attitude contexts, those involving verbs such as “know”, “believe”, etc. These contexts are 
treated, moreover, as relational; i.e., “know”, “believe” (taken in their sentential complement 
mode) are treated, not as intensional operators, but as two-place predicates whose relata are 
individual concepts of subjects and either propositions or propositional concepts.§ None of this 
tells us very much about how they would treat the standard modalities. Why no mention of 
these modalities, the hard-core intensional operators? 
The answer to the mystery of the missing modalities is to be found, I think, in the intuitions 
behind the Principle of Uniqueness. The crucial motivation is the view that the “nodes [of a 
semantic network] represent he concepts and beliefs of a thinking, reasoning, language using 
being (e.g. a human)“[7]. Hence the centrality of the propositional attitudes. But these generate 
contexts which are arguably not just intensional but hyperintensional (and perhaps to the nth 
degree). (The slightly garish term is due to Cresswell[l4].) Hyperintensional contexts are those in 
which substitution of logically equivalent sentences or strictly identical terms is not guaranteed to
preserve truth. Thus, to take a particularly startling case, it is arguable that from the fact that S 
believes that P and Q it does not follow that S believes that Q and P. Again, from that the fact that 
S believes that 4 is even, it does not follow that S believes that the square of 2 is even. (Or that 4 is 
not odd.) Now Shapiro and Maida certainly seem to view belief contexts as hyperintensional and it 
is this which gives sense to the Principle of Uniqueness: no two distinct nodes (represent 
expressions which) are intersubstitutable salve ueritate in all the contexts the language can 
generate. That is, every distinction between odes made purely syntactically by the language isa 
semantically significant distinction-there is some context which semantically “separates” any 
two distinct expressions. Thus Shapiro: “No two distinct nodes represent truly equal 
tNeedless to say, identity between elements of D is world-relative; the primitive notion is strict identity between k’s, 
i.e. co-extensiveness at all i. For simplicity, we assume totality. 
$1 should note, though, that Bressan’s is an omega-type intentional system. as arc some of the Montague logics. 
$As a reminder, a proposition-the intension of a sentence-is a function from I into {T, F}. A propositional concept 
would be an individual concept whose extension at a world is a proposition; it is a function from 1 into functions from I 
into (T, F}. 
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concepts”[7].1 Given this, it is clear enough why they would want to treat belief-contexts 
relationally; for there can be no question of a “logic of belief”-there are no laws to govern the 
behavior of a logical functor for be1ief.t And, given the very same, it is clear enough why so little is 
said about the standard modalities, which are merely (not hyper-) intensional. 
There is no very happy account of hyperintensionality from within the model-theoretic 
framework (or elsewhere); although there are attempts. A move first proposed by Carnap in [I71 
is to specify a finer-grained notion than logical equivalence, to that of intensional isomorphism, in
terms of the construction trees of complex expressions and the intensions assigned the 
constituent expressions. For example, take two sentences which are purely truth-functional 
tautologies, hence which are true in the same (namely, all) possible worlds. They might, 
however, be formed out of different constituents and these might have different intensions, etc. 
This move might or might not handle the case of sentential conjunction raised above; and, of 
course, one most certainly has the option of stipulating that if someone believes that P & Q, 
s/he believes that Q & P.9 
To return to the central point: if one is focussing on propositional attitude, allegedly 
hyperintensional contexts, it can seem like a waste of time to introduce model-theoretic 
accounts of intensionality at all. Thus the air of desperation about the foregoing attempt o use 
such an account (albeit a non-standard one) to explicate a semantic net formalism that is 
focussed on the propositional attitudes. 
(More than) enough has been said, I hope, to support my claim that in taking SNePS 
seriously, in particular in attempting to present a semantic account which honors some of the 
intuitions of its creator(s), one is led into rather interesting, if slightly forbidding, logical terrain. 
Of course, enough has also been said to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that there are 
significant open problems to be solved before a fuily adequate account can be given; the major 
one being that of providing a model-theoretic account of propositional attitude contexts which 
is both formally impeccable and at least a little plausible.8 
5. INHERITANCE 
I want now to take a look at those semantic network formalisms in which the notion of 
inheritance is central. Here, too, the work is motivated by a certain “family” of intuitions. I
would not want to try to ascribe these intuitions to any one in particular and perhaps no one 
believes all of them. I will state them baldly and without comment. (If you’d like, you may 
imagine me to be making up a position out of whole cloth and then, perversely, imposing upon 
myself the duty of making forma1 sense out of it.) 
(1) The graph-theoretic nature of semantic networks counts for something above and 
beyond “ease” of formulating and implementing access and retrieval algorithms. 
(2) There is something in principle wrong about the way in which standard semantic 
accounts eparate the language from “theories” expressed in the language-not enough is fixed 
by the specification of the language itself. In some sense, different languages implicate different 
theories. 
(3) Somehow the central role in thought (and language) of kind terms, in particular of 
natural kind terms, must be captured-and to do this, one must take seriously the fact that 
natural kinds come in families on which hierarchical, taxonomic relations are defined. 
These three “intuitions” coalesce to form a certain perspective on semantic nets.l( This 
*Note: it is one thing to require that no two primitive terms are co-intensional; it is quite another to argue that no two 
terms-primitive or not-are such. This latter, though, seems to be the Shapiro-Maida position. 
$11 is not necessary to hold this view of the hyperintensionality of propositional attitude contexts to dissuade one from 
the logical operator position; see Montague[lS, 161. But it sure as heck is sufficient. 
&Doubts have been raised about the efficacy of such a move, especially with respect to the iteration of propositional 
attitudes over different subjects. In particular. try Mates’s matrix: Let D and D’ be two intensionally isomorphic sentences. 
Then the following are also intensionally isomorphic: (a) Whoever believes (that) D, believes (that) D. (b) Whoever believes 
(that) D believes (that) D’. But nobody wonders whether anybody doubts that whoever believes D believes D; but some 
philosopher may well wonder whether anybody doubts that whoever believes D believes D’[l8]. 
eThere have. of course. been significant attempts in this direction; in the AI. literature the outstanding candidates are 
]I91 and [IO]. Needless to say, there is much. much more that needs to be said; sad to say, it will here go unsaid. 
II.Actually. 1 do not in this paper take natural kinds as seriously as one might; in particular, not as seriously as I do in 
[?I]. 
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perspective often carries along with it a commitment to some theory or other of prototypes and 
this commitment is often understood, mistakenly, as constituting an essential constraint on any 
semantic account of such a semantic net formalism. (For more on this, see [22].) In what 
follows, I shall completely ignore all issues about prototypes.+ 
Some preliminary comment on (2) is called for. I have often thought that there was a 
systematic onfusion of language and theory evident in the work on semantic networks. One 
was never given a specification of the “language” neat: rather, what one got were notations for 
- particular sentences and one was supposed to be able to go on from there. But how is one to 
know how to go on, unless one knows, at the very least, what is fixed and structural, as against 
what is subject o variation by way (e.g.) of varying meaning assignments?* Despite (or because 
of) my worries about this confusion, I think it worthwhile to attempt a rational reconstruction 
of the intuition that a partial theory of the world is “directly” embedded in the languages we 
use in thinking and speaking about that world. 
The best way to shed a little light on the second of our central intuitions is by contrast. The 
standard mode of specifying a quantification language (or language scheme) includes the 
specification of a typically infinite set of typically infinite sets of predicate letters of all possible 
arities. To interpret such a language in the classical model-theoretic way, one assigns a set as 
the domain for the variables and an extension to each predicate letter. In the standard vein, 
these assignments are to subsets of the n-place Cartesian product of the domain of the 
variables (for n-place predicates).§ 
The predicates, individually, are syntactically unstructured and, collectively, are no more 
than members of various unordered sets. That is to say, from a semantic point of view, there 
are no constraints on the interpretations assigned to the members of any set of predicate letters 
beyond that imposed by the arity of the individual predicates. (So, e.g. two-place predicates 
must be assigned subsets of the set of all ordered pairs of members of the domain, etc.) In fact, 
though, there is a kind of constraint: there are to be no semantic interdependencies among the 
extensions of the predicates. That the assignments o predicate letters be independent of one 
another mandates that the specification of the language cannot impose any relationships among 
the extensions of the predicates. Hence, the standard scheme imposes a requirement of logical 
independence among atomic sentences. 
For instance, if one has two one-place predicate letters, “P” and “Q”. one would not 
(indeed, on many accounts, should not) assign to “0” the complement of the set assigned to 
“P”; that’s a job for the negation operator. One can, of course, specify a theory in the language 
which has “(x)(Qx < - > - Px)” as a theorem: but one can also formulate in the same language 
a theory according to which “Q” and “P” are coextensive.ll 
The picture sketched above should be familiar, but it does not seem to fit very well that 
body of work by researchers in Artificial Intelligence which focuses on the related notions of 
taxonomic structures and inheritance. I shall now present a mildly non-standard account in 
which those notions are indeed central. 
6. THE SEMANTICS OF INHERITANCE 
You may think of the sentences of the language as looking a lot like the sentences of a 
standard first-order language, with a few wrinkles, of course. There will be a finite number of 
fAs an aside, the semantic net formalism I have most clearly and fully in mind is KL-ONE, which likewise eschews 
prototypes (see I23.241). 
$Let me remind you of the quotation from [7]: “A semantic network models the knowledge structure of a thinking, 
reasoning, language using being. In this case, nodes represent the concepts and beliefs such a being would have.” This 
certainly sounds like an identification of a given network with a particular creature’s view of its world. 
§A point of terminology: logician-types divide on usage here. I tend to speak of one and the same language being 
susceptible to many different meaning assignments (interpretations). Others speak, rather, of different-applied-languages 
as instances of the same language scheme. Anything said in one mode can be translated into the other. I leave it to the 
reader to make the requisite transformations. 
VWe couldn’t, in the foregoing, talk of the co-extensiveness of “Q” and “not-P”; at least not if we were restricting 
ourselves to the resources available in standard first-order languages. For complex predicates are not among those 
resources; so, in sfrfcfu sensu, there is no predicate available to play the role-solely in virtue of its structure or solely in 
virtue of the specification of the language and the standard semantic account-f the complement of another predicate. 
Rather, we must make do with (complex) open sentences. 
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primitive predicates of not all possible degrees.+ The crucial feature of the account resides in 
the requirement that integral to specifying the semantics of the language is the specification of 
an algebraic structure of properties (concepts, intensions) by which the assignment of exten- 
sions to the predicates is constrained. 
One more preliminary point: the elements of the algebraic structures are to be understood as 
properties. The “linguistic” representatives of these are, in the first instance, lambda-abstracts 
interpreted as singular terms denoting properties. These are then associated with monadic 
predicate letters of the language. When we get around to exploiting lambda-abstraction as a 
complex predicate-forming operator, predicates of the language will look a lot like the singular 
terms for properties with which they are correlated. This is unfortunate and could easily be 
remedied by choosing a different notation for the complex predicate forming operator. (But it won’t 
be so remedied.) Occasional reminders of the distinction between singular terms for properties, on 
the one hand, and predicates, on the other, will be sprinkled about. 
In the first instance, we shall limit ourselves to properties, properly so-called; i.e. syntactic- 
ally speaking, to monadic predicates. Even here choices arise. First, is there one most general, 
all inclusive property? From the graph-theoretic point of view, is the structure a tree, or is it 
rather a forest (an unrooted or multi-rooted tree)? Second, are there cases in which a primitive 
property is immediately included in more than one primitive property-has more than one 
immediate ancestor in the structure? (Are there cases of multiple inheritance among the 
primitive properties?) This is the question, from a graph-theoretic point of view, as to whether 
the structure is a tree (rooted or not) or an upper semi-lattice (perhaps rootless). 
I need not make a decision on these points; such a choice is up to a user of the scheme I am 
describing, and his/her decision, in turn, depends on the structure of the domain of application 
and/or his/her conceptualization of that domain. I should, however, be able to show how an 
account would be given in each case. So I shall begin with the simplest case, that in which the 
structure is an honest-to-goodness tree. 
The ordering relation which generates the algebraic structure is property inclusion (or 
porperty entailment), taken as primitive. There is another significant semantic relation: the 
relation among the immediate descendants of a given node, that is, among siblings. Such 
properties are taken to mutually exclude one another. (One can then define property in- 
dependence in terms of inclusion and exclusion.) The intuition, here, is as follows: imagine a 
portion of the structure which begins with a node for the property of being a mammal. This has, 
say, 10 immediate descendants marked as mutually exclusive, among which are, e.g. the 
property of being a cat, the property of being a pig, etc. Each includes the property of being a 
mammal, and each excludes all the others. Crucially, there is no requirement that the sequence 
of mutually exclusive immediate descendants exhausts the immediately superior property. So 
also, in the case at hand, there is no assumption that the language has primitive predicates for 
each of the mammalian species. Rather, we want to allow for the discovery of new primitive 
properties (new species), and their introduction into the language, though not perhaps without 
limit. I shall return to this point in a moment3 
Given the above, it’s fairly easy to see how the structure of properties hould constrain the 
assignments of extensions to the primitive predicates, those predicates which are associated 
with nodes in the structure. Such predicates are interpreted, first, by assigning them intensions, 
properties. The structure among these properties, then, generates the relations among the 
extensions (sets) associated with the predicates. Specifying a model for such a system would go 
+We will be able to generate non-primitive predicates of any arity by way of composition, e.g. by forming relational 
products. But we assume that there are only finitely many primitive properties within the ken of the language, at least to 
begin with. 
$As should by now have been made clear, and in case it hasn’t: “primitive” does not mean “simple”. The guiding 
intuition is that the relation between genus and species is like that between determinables, such as the property of being 
colored, and determinates, such as the property of being red. The latter includes the former: but the property of being red 
is not to be analyzed as consisting of the property of being colored together with some other property (unless that other 
property is that of being red). Nor is the property of being colored to be analyzed as an infinite disjunction of its 
determinates; indeed, it does not include any of them; though, to repeat, each of them includes it. In general, more general 
primitives (determinables) are simpler than the less general primitives fdeterminates). For a related, but different view, see 
[25.26] 
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as follows: first, the entire domain is assigned to the topmost primitive.+ The extension assigned 
to a node D which is an immediate descendant of node A must be a subset of the extension 
assigned to A. Moreover, given that D belongs to an n-tuple of immediate descendants of A 
marked as mutually exclusive, the sets assigned to the members of the n-tuple must be disjoint 
subsets of the set assigned to A. In general, however, this family of sets will not exhaust he set 
assigned A. (This, of course, is the extensional reflection of the point made above with respect 
to the intensional structure.) 
Suppose, for example, that there are 10 immediate descendants of MAMMAL, marked as 
mutually exclusive. There will be admissible models in which the extension assigned MAM- 
MAL is not simply the union of the extensions assigned its immediate descendants. The 
primary fact, however, is that the property of being a mammal is not the “logical (conceptual) 
sum” of its immediate subordinates. It is not, that is, definable in terms of them; it is not-ex 
hypothesi-definable at al1.S 
To accommodate multiple inheritance-to allow our structure to be an (upper) semilattice- 
we need enter only one amendment. Where D is immediately subordinate to A 1, . . . An, the 
extension assigned to D is, in general, a proper subset of the intersection of the extensions 
assigned to its immediate ancestors. Again, there can be models in which the extension assigned 
to D is the intersection of the sets assigned to Al, . . . An; but we are assuming that D is a 
primitive and thus that it is not definable in terms of the other primitives.0 
Finally, we shall take a quick look at the unrooted (or multi-rooted) option. Should the 
assignments to the n topmost nodes be independent, identical, or should they rather be 
mutually exclusive? The first of these options best fits the natural treatment of assignments o
parallel and independent nodes. The question to be asked, of course, is what intuitions motivate 
the move to a forest? My own perusal of the relevant literature convinces me that there is one 
kernel intuition, which yields, at the very least, a forest with two topmost nodes. The kernel 
intuition is our old friend, intuition (3), in disguise. There is to be one tree for kinds of things 
and another for qualities of things. Kinds must be distinguished from qualities; being a cat must 
be distinguished (in kind, no doubt) from being red. 
If this is the operative intuition, I would assume that the assignments would go as follows: 
the whole domain is assigned to the topmost node in “thing-hierarchy”. Within that hierarchy 
things go as before. But now what to do with the quality sub-tree? If one buys the third 
intuition in a strong form, qualities don’t belong to particular things; but only to particular F’s 
or G’s, where “7 and “G” are schematic placeholders for common nouns. To buy this 
intuition, then, is to hold that all predications (attributions) of a quality to an individual are 
really attributions of the quality to a particular instance of some kind. Put another way: this 
intuition leads one to deny that kinds of things and qualities of things should be treated as on a 
par-as both independently determining extensions. (There is such an entity as the set of cats: a 
set of things which are cats; but there is no such set as the set of things which are red. Still, 
there is a set of cats which are red.) So, the appropriate move would be to treat the hierarchy of 
qualities in a quite different way than the taxonomy of kinds: the predicates correlated with 
these nodes do not get assigned extensions. Such predicates are treated as belonging to a 
different logical type than the predicates correlated with kind-properties. A plausible line is to 
treat qualities as functions from kinds to kinds, and in the first instance, as functions from 
primitive kinds to defined kinds.8 
tI’m assuming, for the sake of simplicity and familarity, a standard first-order model structure. In earlier versions of 
this paper, I had not attempted to satisfy the seemingly deep-seated psychological need for specifying such a structure for 
the language. One alternative was to eschew sets as extensions of predicates altogether and stick with properties; another, 
a variant of suggestions due to van Fraassen[25,26], was set-theoretic with a vengence. That I treat the relationship 
between the intensional structure and the CkdSS of admissible models in the way I do here is due almost entirely to the 
philosopher and logician George Smith. For more on this, see the acknowledgement at the end of the paper. 
$Note this has the consequence that there can be models in which there are individuals which are assigned to no other 
predicate than the one correlated with the highest node(s), and so on down for intermediate predicates, e.g. individuals that 
are-in a given model-mammals, without belonging to any specified species of mammal. For a like-minded view. see [27]. 
5We can, of course, introduce a term for the non-primitive property in question-(LAMBDA(x) (Al(x) & & An(x))); 
just as in the case discussed above, we could have (LAMBDA (x)(Al(x)u.. uAn(x))). Reminder: these lambda 
expressions are property-designators; they are not to be confused with the complex predicates with which they are 
correlated. More on complex properties and complex predicates below. 
BSyntactically, then, “adjectives”, quality-predicates, are of the category CNICN; this, of course, is the treatment they 
receive in Montague style grammars for natural languages. 
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This last discussion raises the possibility of yet another deviation in syntax from standard 
first order languages in the direction of sortal quantifiers. We might require that all 
quantification, indeed all variable binding, including lambda-abstraction, be kind-restricted. 
Here there are options: one has been explored by Barwise and Cooper[28]; another, closer on 
the surface to standard first-order notation has been advanced by Gupta[29]. Distinguish 
between predicates, properly so called, and common nouns, and stipulate that if and only if C is 
a common noun, x a variable and F a formula, then (Vx, C)F is a formula. Also, iff as above, 
then (LAMBDA (x, C)F) is a complex, defined predicate-correlated with the defined property 
of being a C which is F. The crucial point is that variable binding requires a sortal. No 
predication withobt classification; no quantification without classification either.t 
Two last points. First, I have said nothing about whether the formation of complex 
properties by qualification of simple kinds is unrestricted. For instance, I have said nothing to 
rule in or out such properties as being a number which is red or being an idea which is green.S 
This point is connected with the second one. Once we have split up our tree into a forest, why 
not split up our sub-trees. So, for instance, why assume a single topmost node in the kind 
hierarchy, a node, presumably, for the property of being a thing? Surely, we can spiit here as 
well, separating off a tree of physical things from a three of abstract entities, etc. We can, then, 
do the same for qualities and somehow express selection restrictions blocking the anomalous 
“kinds” instanced above. All these things are possible, and some of them may even be 
desirable. Here, too, I shall beg off pursuing the details of the various options open to us. 
I won’t now go into any details of the ways of extending our structures to handle the 
correlates of many-placed predicates. I do, however, assume that there are only finitely many 
primitives, so for some n, there will be no primitive relations of degree n or greater. Relations 
of such degrees there will be generated (e.g.) by taking relational products of relations of lesser 
degree. There are, of course, a number of questions to be answered and a number of options to 
be explored. E.g. shall we allow inclusion relations between relations of different degree; and if 
so, how shall we handle such cases? How shall we mark, e.g. the fact that for a given ordered 
pair (x, y) to be in the extension associated with a certain two-place predicate, the first element 
must have a certain property or belong to some specified kind? I will simply note here that there 
are no significant obstacles to the extension to polyadic relations, whichever of the options 
available to us in the monadic case we decide to extend to the polyadic. 
Finally, a brief mention of complex, defined properties and their associated complex 
predicates. From what was said above, it should be clear that there are options as well with 
respec? to the kinds of complex concept forming operators we allow. For instance, if one opts 
for the single rooted structure, one may opt for standard, unrestricted Boolean compounds. So, 
one would expect a node for the defined property of being a red cat: (LAMBDA (x) (cat (x) & 
red (x))) which in every admissible model will be assigned the intersection of the sets assigned 
to its two constituent primitives. If, on the other hand, one is attracted to the picture suggested 
by intuition (3), the relevant complex concept-forming functor will be of the CNICN variety, 
i.e. the compound will really be a result of function application. Moreover, one might want to 
+A few remarks are in order here. It would be misleading to suggest that the only deviations to be encountered here 
were syntactic. Roughly in order of increasing distance from the familiar: We can opt for sortal quantification, but allow 
both those predicates associated with sorts or kinds and those associated with qualities to determine sets as extensions. 
Needless to say. not all qualities are created equal; compare “male criminals” with “alleged criminals” with “tall 
criminals”. Arguably. only the first could plausibly be treated in terms of set-theoretic intersection anyway. For more on 
this, see [30]. To remain as close as possible to standard first-order model structures, we would then simply posit that the 
intensions associated with the first kind of monadic predicate were a special kind of property. viz. that of belonging to a 
particular natural kind. leaving this last notion primitive so far as the specification of the semantic account is concerned. 
This is what we have done with the notion of a property: we have most emphatically not explicated this notion in the 
standard modal model-theoretic way as a function from possible worlds to sets of (possible) individuals. Just as in standard 
model-theoretic treatments of modality the notion of possible world is unexplicated. The next option should now be 
obvious; we can move to a modal model structure and assign different semantic types to predicates for kinds and 
predicates for qualities. For a version of this move, less radically deviant than Bressan’s. see Gupta’s “The Logic of 
Common Nouns”. More radical still is the analysis in terms of function application. One alternative would be a variant of 
the account given by Barwise and Cooper; this has the attractive feature of not going unnecessarily modal. Here, too, we 
would take the notion of natural kinds as primitive from the point of view of semantic theory. 
SFrom a syntactic point of view: 1 have not discussed restrictions on that mode of complex “predicate” forming which 
consists of applying an adjectival modifier to a kind term. Semantically speaking, I’m avoiding giving a semantical account 
of sortal incorrectness or anomaly. For one such account. see [31]. 
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block Boolean compounds of (primitive) kind terms (e.g. both (LAMBDA (x) (cat (x) & dog 
(x))) and (LAMBDA (x) (flower (x) v mouse (x))). Surely, one will want to allow some such 
combinations of qualities, even if only sortally restricted combinations; e.g. (LAMBDA (x, cat) 
(white (x) v black (x))). But, then what of (LAMBDA (x, cat) (white (x) & black (x)))- 
assuming WHITE and BLACK are marked as mutually exclusive under COLORED? Once all 
these decisions are made, one can specify the nature of the resulting structure of all possible 
properties-primitive and defined. Once again, I forego the messy details. 
Enough has been said, I hope, to make fruitful an attempt o answer the question that will 
naturally arise in the mind of anyone used to a more orthodox account. Why not capture all these 
intuitions about semantic interdependencies among primitives by way of meaning postulates? This 
last is the traditional alternative mode of capturing the intuition that items in the extralogical 
vocabulary can partially determine the implication relations among sentences.t 
There are, I think, reasons for preferring the semantic network picture. First, the meaning 
postulate account denies (or does not account for) the distinction between analytic sentences, 
whose necessity is grounded in the internal structure of their non-logical vocabulary, and either 
logical truths or non-logical necessary truths. So for instance, the account takes no official 
cognizance of the distinction between sentences uch as “Every even number is the sum of two 
primes”, and “All cats are mammals”. The first, if true, is a necessary truth about the natural 
numbers; it is not a logical truth. The second, according to a particular instance of the account I
have sketched, is rendered true solely by the full specification of the language to which that 
sentence belongs; yet it too is not, in the standard sense, a truth of logic. Nor does the 
traditional account distinguish either of the above two sentences from “All squares are 
rectangles” or “All squares are either squares or red”.$ 
To return for a moment o pure description. If someone wanted to specify as part of the 
determination of his/her language that the predicate associated with the property of being a 
mammal was analytically entailed by that associated with the property of being a cat, one could 
do so by arranging the intensional structure associated with the language in the right way. And 
this dependency between the two primitive predicates would be something over and above the 
necessity of the associated universalized conditional sentence.§ 
The first reason for preferring a semantic network account to one in terms of meaning 
postulates introduces a second. One major difference between the non-standard account 
sketched and the traditional alternative is that meaning postulates are simply sentences of the 
language picked out from their siblings in just the same way that axioms are picked out in 
standard axiomatizations-namely, by being stuck in a list with the metalinguistic heading 
“AXIOM” (“MEANING POSTULATE”) prefixed to it. The crucial point here is that, in the 
standard accounts, one uses the meaning postulates precisely as axioms. The set of “analytic” 
sentences i  identified with the set of (standard) logical consequences of the postulates; for the 
finicky, the purely logical truths are often subtracted. Thus the meaning postulates enter into 
the explication of analyticity solely in virtue of their logical form plus their tag. The inter- 
pretations of the syntactic primitives covered by the postulates are not incorporated into the 
specification of the language. In the nonstandard account, on the other hand, the primary 
necessities are not formal; the relation of “predicate inclusion” that holds between (e.g.) “cat” 
and “mammal” is not a function of their logical forms; they are both syntactically simple 
tThe idea is due to Carnap and has been extensively exploited by Montague and his followers (see [16, 171). Ron 
Brachman and myself raised this possibility in [22] (see also [27]). 
SThe differences alluded to above are tricky matters. Why not claim that the necessary truth of the second sentence is 
grounded in facts about the world of living things and their essences? This is Kripke’s view in [32]. I am sympathetic to this 
rejoinder; still, a few points can be made. First, I am simply presenting for your delectation and delight a view according to 
which there is a distinction between sentences whose necessity is grounded in extra-linguistic matters of fact and those 
(perhaps also) grounded in the very structure of the language itself; though not in the way the truths of logic are so 
grounded. According to the present proposal, one can accommodate these distinctions. So much by way of “argumen- 
tation”. 
BThe arcs in the conceptual structure between super- and subordinate nodes do not realize the complex syntactic 
operation of forming the universalized conditional sentence in whose matrix the open sentence whose predicate is that 
correlated with the subordinate node is the antecedent and whose consequent is the open sentence associated with the 
superordinate node. Nodes and links are one thing; sentences another. Of course, the abstract syntax of the language could 
be realized by a set of graph-type structures and operations thereon, rather than the usual linear, one-dimensional 
structures. To take this last point as important is to trivialize the first of our three guiding intuitions. 
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predicates and hence are devoid of significant logical form.t In this respect, compare “(x) 
(Crow (x) -) Bird (x))” and “(x) (Crow (x) - ) Black (x))“. These sentences are of exactly the 
same syntactic type; but, again on at least one plausible instance of the scheme sketched, the 
truth of the first is grounded in property inclusion and, thereby, in the language itself; not so 
that of the second. 
This second point leads us to the third and penultimate point. The relations of inclusion or 
entailment between primitive predicates are not, we have noted, a matter of logic at all. Rather, 
they are determined solely by the structure of primitives; and, in principal, all such relations 
can be “read right of?” from the structure. Indeed, a central feature of the account given here is 
that it allows us to make a sharp distinction between matters of logic and matters of language. 
Matters of logic are matters of logical form; there is no room for such concerns to intrude on 
the inclusion relations among the primitive predicates. Computationally, matters of logic relate 
to inferential operations; more concretely, to the application of rules of transformation. These 
last are aptly named. Where there is deduction, there are steps, steps which involve the 
manipulation and generation (broadly speaking, the transformation) of terms or of formulae. 
There are no such steps involved with respect o determining the crucial semantic relationships 
among primitive predicates; there is nothing beyond lookup. That is, we stipulate that the 
algebraic structure of primitives must be specified completely in advance. That specification can 
be seen as being realized in a number of ways; but in the abstract it is as if attached to each 
node was a specification of the paths on which it is located, and of course, its relative location 
on that path. There is no computation to be done beyond seeing whether a given other predicate 
does or does not appear on such a path (and where). If this latter does, in a particular 
implementation, require computation, that is solely a function of the implementation. To put the 
point in yet another, and clearer, way: the computational steps involved in actually traversing 
the tree and establishing relative locations among a given set of nodes are not to be identified 
with the computational steps involved in implementing a proof procedure which is sensitive to 
the logical forms of the expressions over which its operations are defined. 
Finally, one minor point about the alternative account using meaning postulates. Let’s look 
at an extremely simple case in which there is one node, A, which immediately dominates two 
others, Al and A2, respectively. We assume that these two subordinate nodes are marked as 
mutually exclusive. What would the set of meaning postulates be? At first, things are simple: 
“(x) (Al(x) -) A(x))“, “(x) (A2(x) -) A(x))“, “(x) (Al(x) -) - A2(x))“. Now, how about “-(x) 
(A(x) -) (Al(x) v Am))“? By itself, this won’t do. Though it’s crucial that “A”‘s extension 
not be determined in all models to be simply the union of the extensions assigned to “Al” and 
“A?‘, we don’t want to rule out that the set of A’s actually is, as it happens, just that union. 
Another option is to take advantage of the resources of set theory. In every case like the one at 
hand, we can simply introduce a predicate, “A3”-which will, of course, be a syntactically 
simple predicate, for in the standard story, there are no others-and assign to it the following 
set: {xi Ax & - Alx & -A2x}. The set assigned to “A3” can be empty or not. This assignment 
goes somewhat against he grain of the standard story, since it is completely a function of the 
assignments to the other predicates, and because now the same is true of the assignment to 
“A”. 
Moreover, note the following: if we stipulate that predicates are, in the first place, correlated 
with properties, and if we take seriously the distinction between primitive and defined 
properties, then there is no reason to assume that there is a primitive predicate (one correlated 
with a primitive property) whose associated extension just is the logical difference between 
“A”‘s extension and the union of the extensions of “Al” and “A2”. Indeed, the only way we 
might have of representing the extension of “A3” is by way of a set abstract in which the 
subsuming predicate (“A”) makes an essential appearance. (Surely we can assume that we can’t 
always present he relevant sets by lists of their members.)* 
There are other options, of course. One is to go modal. First, we prefix all of the foregoing 
(except the denial of exhaustion of A’s) with a necessity operator. Then, what we want is that 
+I trust the reader will pardon the sloppiness involved in talk of “predicate” as opposed to “property” inclusion. 
$1 have presumed that it is a condition of adequacy that the primitive character of the properties be captured by the 
postulates. This requirement. of course, might be challenged. 
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there can be A’s which are neither Al’s nor A2’s. I.e. “It is not necessary that (x) (A(x) -) 
(Al(x) v A2(x))“. (Or: “It is possible that there be an A which is neither an Al nor an A2”.) 
The modal move is not unnatural; but it strikes me as better not to introduce modalities until 
one has to, to handle explicit modal operators for example. Let’s not muck about with other 
worlds until we’ve done what we can with the resources available to us in this one. 
I shall refrain from going on at any length at all about the most appropriate account of the 
logical connectives in the kind of scheme I’ve sketched. In a sense, what I’ve said about the 
non-logical vocabulary can be seen as imposing no constraints on a semantic account of the 
logical vocabulary, especially if we confine our attention to logical operations on sentences, and 
ignore the use of logical operators in forming complex, defined predicates.+ 
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